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THE SIX BOOKS REVIEWED HERE ARE A VARIED GROUP, all relating in
different ways to the criminal justice history of Canada generally. Debra Komar’s
Ballad of Jacob Peck and Lynching of Peter Wheeler are more popular texts on two
specific cases, one in New Brunswick and the other in the Annapolis Valley of Nova
Scotia, while Marcel Martel’s Canada the Good: A Short History of Vice Since 1500
is an academic examination of state regulation that depends upon secondary sources.
The remaining three – Paul Craven’s Petty Justice, Michael Boudreau’s City of
Order, and R. Blake Brown’s Arming and Disarming – are scholarly works drawn
from close engagement with archival and other primary sources.1
Jacob Peck tells the story of a murder in rural New Brunswick, near Shediac, in
1805. Komar aims to correct earlier versions of this troubling, sad story of a farmer,
inspired by a religious pretender, who loses his grasp on reality and murders his
sister. Peter Wheeler tells of the conviction and execution of a man of colour after
the murder of a teenaged girl in the Annapolis Valley in the mid-1890s. Applying her
training as a forensic anthropologist and working through the evidence from the
legal records and the newspapers as the community of Bear River erupted against
Peter Wheeler, Komar convincingly makes the case that Wheeler was by no means
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of misunderstandings of the law in Jacob
Peck and Komar’s expertise with forensics – which is much more apparent in Peter
Wheeler – the latter is the better book. Komar contextualizes both cases through
discursive excursions into the backgrounds of the various characters. In both books,
and despite uncertainty in the evidentiary record, Komar adopts strong, indignant
views of the events. Both books are lightly footnoted, and Komar does not hesitate
to tell us what even peripheral characters were thinking – literary strategies that
undoubtedly increase their appeal for a popular audience.
Marcel Martel’s Canada the Good, by contrast, relies largely on secondary
literature to provide a history of state and non-state regulation of activities that have
been deemed morally problematic over Canada’s history. My undergraduate
students in Law and Society would love it. Governed by a social control thesis, the
book tracks the efforts of individuals, churches, government actors, and voluntary
organizations to control troubling activities and substances – including extramarital
sex, gambling, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and the use of
tobacco, liquor and drugs – from the early days of New France to the early 21st
century. Martel describes the shift from a moral to a medical understanding of these
1 Debra Komar, The Ballad of Jacob Peck (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2013); Debra Komar,
The Lynching of Peter Wheeler (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2014); Marcel Martel, Canada
the Good: A Short History of Vice Since 1500 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
2014); Paul Craven, Petty Justice: Low Law and the Sessions System in Charlotte County, New
Brunswick, 1785-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 2014);
Michael Boudreau, City of Order: Crime and Society in Halifax, 1918-35 (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2012); R. Blake Brown, Arming and Disarming: A History of Gun Control in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 2012).
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activities, the worries about often-racialized “outsiders” that have characterized the
panics of various periods, and the impact of professionalization and liberalization on
how we have collectively responded to these social phenomena. The book builds
narrative momentum as it moves through the 20th century, but the bibliography
seems good for all periods.
Craven’s book is a compendious analysis of archival material that reveals the
day-to-day workings of the magistracy system in Charlotte County, New Brunswick,
from its earliest days until Confederation. Craven pays close attention to the goals
and incentives built into the system, and traces its breakdown in the mid-19th
century under the pressures of external forces and new political ideologies. Michael
Boudreau focuses on Halifax and its responses to perceptions of an increase in
violent crime in the early 20th century; City of Order is a fascinating story of a city’s
uncertainty in navigating aspects of what we have come to call “modernity.” Blake
Brown’s Arming and Disarming describes the changing legal and constitutional
treatment of troubling, increasingly potent devices – firearms – as Canada became
increasingly urban, consumerist, and bureaucratic. After assessing the prevalence of
firearms before 1867, Brown describes how the federal government’s pre-First
World War commitment to arming Canadians turned to favour disarming them as the
20th century passed. Published by well-regarded academic presses, all three of these
books are path-breaking works by academic historians who engage the existing
literature and treat evidence with exemplary care.
Read together, these books shed considerable light on the history not only of the
Canadian justice system but also on the growth of the regulatory state; changing
interpretations of constitutional rights; and the impact of the rise of consumerism,
new technologies, and the media. This review essay describes how these books
contribute to our knowledge of these different areas and suggests new directions for
scholarship that they open up.
The state
These texts tell a remarkably rich story of the evolution of what we have come to
call “the state.” It is a story of redrawing boundaries between low and high law (in
Paul Craven’s terms), of the centralization of power, of increasing demands on the
state and its increasing capacity to respond, and of changing ideas about how
individuals should discharge their offices. Craven’s Petty Justice takes us to the site
of “low law” in Charlotte County in the late 18th century, to the justices of the peace
and surveyors. The power exercised in the community was local, personal, and not
overly bound up in the concerns of the empire. Craven asserts “The principal objects
of low law in Charlotte county were to preserve peaceful social relations, maintain
social and economic order, and retain local elite control of local affairs” (320).
Craven describes how this system functioned and how it came to an end.
Sitting together and individually, the magistrates of Charlotte County taxed,
licensed, enforced credit obligations, administered social welfare, and attempted to
preserve order. Criminal justice was a small part of their work, and some justices
avoided it completely. Some magistrates sat in the provincial assembly, which
Craven argues was not much concerned with local affairs until about the 1830s. Its
job was to distribute provincial revenue. Governance was the business of the
magistracy. Most of what the justices did had little to do with the “high law” of the
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common law and more specialized courts. Being a magistrate was a marker of social
prominence. Most – but by no means all – were merchants with some degree of
prosperity, although by far the most active magistrate Craven discusses, Charles
Reid Hatheway, was not a merchant and could be particularly useful and active
precisely because he was not conspicuously entangled in the commercial relations
of the area. Magistrates’ professional responsibilities and personal interests were
intertwined in ways that became problematic and were accordingly separated and
regularized as the decades passed, preparing the way for the development of the
modern administrative state.
Craven describes how these tensions played out in the evolution of the office of
deputy land surveyor as well. The position and the remuneration it afforded changed
as land became a source of government revenue rather than a reward for service and
loyalty. “The first generation of surveyors,” Craven notes, “considered their
deputations to be entitlements and their participation in public life to be corollary to
the pursuit of conscientious self-interest” (186). Not only did they draw boundaries
and suggest solutions to disputes, but they also speculated in land. In the middle
decades of the century, after a far-reaching scandal, self-interested practices came to
be seen as inconsistent with the role of a public servant. After 1865 the scope of
“private entrepreneurship” was reduced so that deputy land surveyors worked
“within an increasingly straitened framework of bureaucratic regulation and
procedure,” even as they “continued to dispense low law, improvise departmental
policy, and pursue substantive justice within the emerging institutional and
administrative environment” (190). Undoubtedly similar shifts occurred in other
offices, which other work will, I hope, unearth.
One of the great strengths of Craven’s book is its careful attention to finances. In
the early years magistrates could assess the parishes to support paupers, issue liquor
licences and fine bootleggers, and collect penalties under various other provincial
statutes, which they could use for limited purposes. Funding major public works
required the legislature’s cooperation. Craven describes in detail how first the
county building projects and later the Irish famine migration created financial
pressures that strained the sessions system heavily. Encouraged, undoubtedly, by
new discourses about governance, the population increasingly demanded greater
government transparency and responsibility. As well, as the temperance movement
strengthened, revenues from liquor licensing fell, enforcement proved difficult, and
concerns about disorderly behaviour increased; the costs of professional policing,
however, looked hard to bear. The temperance movement and the emergence of
party politics in an increasingly active provincial government led to the
multiplication and politicization of magisterial appointments. With the overall
centralization of the provincial administration and other financial pressures, the
jurisdiction of the county justices was reduced. Municipal government was
gradually reshaped and regularized beginning in the early 1850s, with municipal
incorporation becoming mandatory in the 1870s.
In the middle decades of the 19th century, much of the magistrates’ jurisdiction
drifted to the provincial government. The low law the magistrates administered
became less and less relevant. Their criminal jurisdiction had been dramatically
curtailed by the late 1860s. County and parish courts, subject to appellate review,
acquired jurisdiction to hear low-value civil cases. Craven’s conclusion, however, is
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not that low law – with its commitment to efficient, substantive justice – ended with
modernization but that it more likely moved into other regulatory bodies, boards,
and agencies that had (and have) proliferated in the modern state and “may have
more in common with the local justice of the ancien regime than is generally
recognized” (486). He concludes, therefore, with a call for a close examination of
these bodies.
The question of the state’s capacity to meet the demands placed on it runs through
Michael Boudreau’s City of Order and R. Blake Brown’s Arming and Disarming.
Boudreau captures a period when Haligonians, anxious about crime and disorder,
yearned for a stable, peaceful (romanticized) past. They theorized about how best to
prevent future crime. Institutions were revised: a juvenile court was established in
1911, one woman police officer was hired in 1917 and a second in 1918, and the first
patrol car changed the routine of the beat in 1921. Debates over prison reform
demonstrated the mixture of aspirations and assumptions about punishment and
rehabilitation that shaped the state’s approaches to different types of offenders.
Perhaps crime’s causes lay in poverty, hereditary “degeneracy,” or poor parenting.
Perhaps offenders – or maybe only youth offenders – could be reformed, or perhaps
not. The state’s capacity grew in fits and starts.
Brown’s book also sheds light on the growth of the state, as it responded to
demands made on it. Well before Confederation, colonial governments attempted to
restrict the use of firearms by particular people in particular places. Until about 1970,
however, government actors expressed doubts about the state’s capacity to exert the
degree of control over firearms that some constituents sought, and especially to
regulate mere possession as opposed to sales. Despite great public concern about
pistols, particularly, in the 1870s and 1880s, the government did not require vendors
to keep track of gun sales until 1892 (78).2 The first gun registry was established for
pistols in 1934. It was not until the late 1960s that the federal government started to
attempt to require the registration of all firearms, and all firearms owners, rather than
only a minority. Still, even when a registry was finally operational in the early 2000s,
the difficulties and inefficiencies in implementing it made it a financial debacle. The
unhappy political consequences of committing the state to a task that seemed
politically necessary but strained its capacity might have seemed more than vaguely
familiar to Craven’s magistrates. Brown’s text, like Craven’s and Boudreau’s, shows
how specific demands and responses, in the face of broader political necessities, have
interacted to cause parts of the apparatus of the Canadian state – local, provincial, and
federal – to extend their scope, and how financial exigencies and other factors (such
as constitutional sensibilities and consumer preferences, discussed below) have
pushed this process in different directions. Martel’s discussion of the regulation of
alcohol, gambling, drugs (including thalidomide), and tobacco in the 20th century
sheds further light on these processes, because debates about these “vices” – popular,
taxable, and also troubling to the consciences of many – show the bargaining over
2 For a discussion of the increasing reach of the surveillance state signalled by the new 1892
Criminal Code, see Desmond H. Brown and Barry Wright, “Codification, Public Order, and the
Security Provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code, 1892,” in Canadian State Trials. Vol. III:
Political Trials and Security Measures, 1840-1914, ed. Barry Wright and Susan Binnie (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 2009), 516-63.
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interests and the changes in the capacity of the modern democratic state. Further work
will, I hope, elaborate the ideologies, exigencies, and technologies that have shaped
the Canadian state and its ambitions.
Canadian constitutionalism
Constitutional understandings are an important constraint on the shape and reach of
the state, although exactly how determinative they are may be debated. These books
tease out understudied threads in Canadian constitutional history, particularly for the
pre-Confederation period. As described above, Craven describes forces that pushed
New Brunswick from local governance by prominent men combining personal and
public interests to centralized, regularized, “responsible” government. These books
also shed light on individuals’ rights with respect to the state and signal that
important changes took place after Confederation.
First, there is the contribution to existing scholarship on the meaning of liberty.3
Craven cites the St. Andrews Standard, in 1855, calling on its readers to petition the
lieutenant governor to veto the statute that brought prohibition into effect on 
1 January 1856: “‘We are still deserving of the name of Britons, and are not to be
dictated to, as to what we shall eat, drink, or avoid, by any small minority belonging
to Temperance Societies” (452). These assertions – that the heirs of British rights
were protected against encroachments on their liberty – failed to persuade the
lieutenant governor, although they may well have been in the minds of the
shopkeepers in St. Andrews who ignored prohibition completely. This “British
liberty” thread persisted into the 20th century in Nova Scotia. According to
Boudreau, Haligonians looked to “British justice” to protect an individual’s liberty
and safety and to ensure social order. A system that was seen to be providing British
justice would be entirely legitimate (79). People seen as non-British became
discursively associated with disorder, although they too have at various times in
Canada’s history insisted that they rightly bore the full rights of British subjects.4
Brown pays considerable attention to the Canadian history of the right to bear
arms. He describes how arguments about this specific right had, by about 1900, been
supplanted by a more general liberal discourse of property rights and personal
protection. In the mid-19th century, though, politicians like Robert Baldwin,
Thomas Cushing Aylwin, Joseph-Édouard Cauchon, and John A. Macdonald
weighed the dangers of firearms (such as those kept near canal projects) against their
conviction that such legislation would encroach on the constitutional right of British
subjects to bear arms. Often in these debates the source of the right was a bit murky,
but Brown argues persuasively that the English Bill of Rights of 1689, as reiterated
3 See, in particular, E.A. Heaman, “Rights Talk and the Liberal Order Framework,” in Liberalism
and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, ed. Jean-François Constant and Michel
Ducharme (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 147-75; Michel Ducharme, The Idea of
Liberty in Canada during the Age of Atlantic Revolutions, 1776-1838, trans. Peter Feldstein
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014); and Robert L. Fraser, “‘All the
Privileges which Englishmen Possess’: Order, Rights, and Constitutionalism in Upper Canada,” in
Provincial Justice: Upper Canadian Legal Portraits from the Dictionary of Canadian Biography,
ed. Robert L. Fraser (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), xxi-xl, esp. xxxii-xl.
4 For a discussion, see Lyndsay Campbell, “Race, Upper Canadian Constitutionalism, and ‘British
Justice’,” Law & History Review 33, no. 1 (February 2015): 41-91.
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in Blackstone’s Commentaries, is the most likely source; Macdonald at one point
cited the Commentaries explicitly (70). As others have noted with respect to other
rights in the British constitutional tradition, people were not all entitled to the same
rights.5 Habeas corpus was available to everyone in the sovereign’s domain, but the
right to bear arms was an entitlement of a more limited class of subjects –
“Protestants” in the Bill of Rights and men of property, likely, in debates over
disarming canallers in the Canadas (32-5).
Canadian governments have tended to prefer passing general legislation that has
allowed for the implementation of executive measures that have targetted particular
groups (and, later, particular kinds of firearms). In an interesting discussion of a
statute that appears never to have been proclaimed after the Northwest Rebellion,
Brown notes that John A. Macdonald’s government
refused to completely disarm western Aboriginal Peoples, but
passed legislation enabling it to place limitations on the possession
or sale of guns in the North-West if necessary. Once proclaimed in
any district of the North-West Territories, the act made it an offence
to possess, sell, exchange, or barter “improved arms” (all weapons
other than smooth-bore shotguns) or ammunition without the
permission of the lieutenant governor. . . .
If proclaimed, the act applied to people of all races, but the debates in
Parliament made clear that the government’s main goal was the
disarmament of Aboriginal Peoples. Prime Minister Macdonald
chose his words carefully, suggesting that Ottawa’s objective was “to
collect arms of precision” to prevent them falling into the “hands of
certain classes” to “give satisfaction and confidence to the settlers.”
Macdonald generally disliked firearm regulation, and he thus pointed
out that the act imposed temporary measures. While Macdonald
referred only to “certain classes,” other MPs openly stated that the
government sought the ability to disarm Aboriginal Peoples (58).
Canadian constitutional thought evidenced a discomfort about “class legislation”
until the later part of the 19th century, when Aboriginal people – transformed into
legal minors – and their lands became subjected to intensive regulation.6 In an
increasingly liberal settler colony, the logic of the right to bear arms, as articulated
in the 1689 Bill of Rights, must have been uncomfortable. Without a written
constitutional bill of rights in the 1867 constitution to reify it, perhaps the emergence
of a straightforwardly liberal understanding of this right – guns as a form of property
prima facie available to anyone, regulated only to prevent harm – made sense. Also
notable in this context, of course, is the deep understanding in 19th-century
constitutionalism that individual rights were to be protected by legislatures, not
courts. Who, if anyone, was in charge of that task after 1867 is murkier; courts
stepped into this role gradually over the course of the 20th century. It is encouraging
to see a body of research growing on 19th-century constitutionalism.
5 See, for example, Heaman, “Rights Talk and the Liberal Order Framework.”
6 See Campbell, “Race, Upper Canadian Constitutionalism, and ‘British Justice’.”
00976-08 Campbell Review Essay_Layout  2015-11-27  6:38 PM  Page 154
Law and Order 155
Doing justice
The books under discussion here together shed light on the civil and criminal justice
systems. In early 19th-century New Brunswick, debts were often difficult to pay, and
the appearance that justice was impartial would have been hard to sustain had
businessmen-magistrates often judged the resulting disputes. In Charlotte County,
magistrate Charles Reid Hatheway, a half-pay officer, did the bulk of this work for
the middle decades of the century. Working from Hatheway’s ledger for April 1840
to April 1841, Craven reconstructs how Hatheway’s courtroom functioned as a
forum for addressing civil disputes and collecting debts in St. Andrews. Craven
concludes that Hatheway delivered inexpensive, accessible, substantive justice. Few
lawyers appeared before Craven, and when they did he deferred to them on the law
but not the facts.
As to criminal justice, one question that is difficult to answer is how prevalent
crime was felt to be in different places at different times. Much depends, notes
Craven, on what criminality is understood to be. Conduct that disturbs a
hierarchically ordered “peace” is no longer a sufficient definition, if it ever was.
Extramarital sex, consuming certain substances, and even some degree of violence,
on the other hand, have been legally criminal even when there was disagreement
about how unacceptable or immoral they were. Preventing and punishing them posed
further difficulties. Smuggling is a similar matter; around 1800, it evidently did not
cause any sort of crisis of conscience in the St. Andrews area (1-7, 13). Alcohol
attracted a variety of regulatory responses. Both the substance itself and its regulation
challenged the ideology and the capacity of the state because, as both Martel and
Craven make clear, it has always been an important source of revenue for those
entitled to regulate it.7 In Charlotte County until the mid-19th century, for instance,
alcohol was not a serious social or moral issue unless it led to inappropriate behaviour
on the Sabbath (413). The moral effects of alcohol started to become a subject of
concern in the 1820s, but they were addressed mainly through licensing and civil
penalties. By the late 1840s, public drunkenness was considered a moral and social
problem such that New Brunswick underwent a brief experiment with prohibition in
the mid-1850s before resuming licensing. Enforcing liquor laws during the eras of
local option and prohibition in the later 19th and early 20th centuries resulted in
significant changes to policing. In Nova Scotia, for instance, prohibition ended after
a 1929 plebiscite. Provincial control of the retail sale and public consumption of
alcohol took its place, with the province briefly experimenting with a provincial
police force that spent half of its energy the first year (1930) on violations of the
liquor laws. The RCMP took over most of the duties of the provincial force in 1932,
after the provincial force fell victim to weak provincial finances (Boudreau, 50). The
difficult question of the costs of using criminal law to address issues over which
society is ideologically divided remains with us, as does the related question of how
(and whether) the criminal justice system can be used to prevent problematic
behaviour or protect potential victims of crime on a fair and equal basis.
7 For example, Martel in Canada the Good states that duties “collected by the King of France on
wine, rum, and other liquor imports constituted 50 percent of colonial revenues in the 1730s and
increased to above 85 percent in the following decade” (40).
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These difficulties arise even for violence. Martel notes that a considerable
tolerance for violence seems to have existed in New France (32-3). Hints that
interpersonal violence was not uncommon appear periodically in Craven’s text as
well. The goal of the sessions system was to preserve the peace. Arrests for
indictable offences did not necessarily lead to committals for trial. Magistrate
Hatheway, sometimes sitting with others, disposed of the vast majority of the cases
before him summarily, with peace bonds or convictions: “About a third of the
complaints before Hatheway ended with the accused entering into sureties to keep
the peace to the complainant with no conviction recorded or penalty imposed (peace
bonds were also imposed along with fines in most assault, abusive language, and
disorderly conduct convictions). Even proceedings in indictable offences could
terminate this way” (310). Was violence more accepted in the mid-19th century, or
was it too difficult to contain? Did the justice system prevent offences? Were all
parts of the community equally satisfied with the punishment meted out? How
should we understand variations in rates of prosecution over breaches of moral
standards?8 Should we expect to find efforts to contain violence or address morals
offences in the records of high law or low law institutions? Were other individuals
and institutions involved?
Related issues run through Boudreau’s discussion of Halifax in the inter-war
years. As Haligonians assessed what they believed to be increasing rates of crime –
or at least violent crime involving guns and knives – they had to articulate an
understanding of how policing and the criminal justice system could render Halifax
a safer, more orderly place. Craven’s justices of the peace had imposed peace bonds
in New Brunswick. Halifax, like other cities, hired police officers (only a few, at
first) to discourage crime. The night watches and day patrols of the 19th century
were supplemented by paid, uniformed police officers enforcing the regularizing,
centralizing new Criminal Code of 1892. Haligonian discourse was generally
liberal, so the failings of the “criminal element” tended to be attributed to individual
choice and weakness with more surveillance and stiffer sentences the prescribed
remedy (and little increase in government spending needed). A growing professional
class had other ideas: social workers, physicians, ministers, and others saw the
environment, new ways of living, poor parenting, and sometimes heredity as
dictating criminality; they called for (costlier) penal reform with an emphasis on
rehabilitation. Their prescriptions were acted on with respect to juveniles, but adults
did not attract similar solicitousness. The increasingly professionalized police force
seemed an ambiguous presence: drawn to both philosophies and suspicious of both
at the same time, trusted with more impressive powers and technologies and
distrusted for failing to pay enough attention to morals offences and for employing
the wrong sort of people to carry firearms.
Women have often been disadvantaged by the criminal justice system. Boudreau
notes women’s increasing public presence in Halifax in the interwar years and the
dangers posed to them. After reviewing women’s participation in the justice system,
Boudreau concludes “hostility towards women was an integral part of daily life in
this city” (155). Women were seldom charged with crimes, but those who appeared
8 See Martel, Canada the Good, 32.
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in certain public spaces (dance halls, disreputable cafes) or who were members of
racial or ethnic minorities – especially African-Canadian women – were highly
vulnerable to being constructed as criminal. Prostitution was a particular anxiety,
especially as it became difficult to distinguish women who were willing to sell sex
from those who were simply milling about after work and open to offers of
entertainment. Boudreau also discusses abortion, infanticide, and spousal abuse –
crimes committed by, for, and against women behind closed doors. The older
discretionary solution of binding an offender not to reoffend continued to be used in
the context of domestic violence in Halifax, in part because incarcerating a male
breadwinner would (it was assumed) penalize a family financially. Vulnerability to
violence – and the question of what the criminal justice system could and would do
for women – remained. The treatment of minority groups raises similar issues.
Boudreau describes the emergence of the idea of a “criminal element” – marked by
class, geography, and often race – and requiring greater surveillance.
Suspicion of racialized others – especially Aboriginal people – has affected
Canadian gun policy again and again, as Brown shows in Arming and Disarming.
As different groups have been perceived as threats, regulatory efforts have been
made to disarm them. The Irish canallers were targetted in the 1840s in the Province
of Canada. Orange-Catholic violence and concerns about working-class unrest
inspired calls for legislation in the late 19th century and after the Winnipeg General
Strike. Groups of immigrants found their access to firearms and ammunition
restricted between 1911 and 1950. Aboriginal people in the west have been
particularly targetted for firearms regulation. In 1885, the federal government issued
an order in council pursuant to an 1884 amendment to the Indian Act to prohibit the
sale or gift of ammunition to any Aboriginal person in the Northwest Territories
without the written permission of the superintendent general of Indian Affairs (60).
Debra Komar’s Lynching of Peter Wheeler is the story of an outsider, a darker-
skinned man with a mysterious past and no local roots hanged for murdering a
teenaged girl in Bear River, Nova Scotia, in 1896. Komar explains that she
specifically chose to write about a case of a wrongful conviction, in which modern-
day forensic science would show that the accused did not commit the crime. The
book is strongest when Komar is discussing the forensic evidence and how the
various participants who conspired to make sure Wheeler was hanged for murder
massaged it. Komar’s disgust with the self-promoting detective at the core of the
story, and especially at the salivating, competitive early 20th-century media, make the
story a rollicking tale; but her narrative style does not make it easy to see how she
evaluated the claims of all of the conflicting assertions in the various newspapers.
Nevertheless, Wheeler was certainly not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Crown’s case did not make sense, and the defence was wholly inadequate. The
clemency process in Ottawa was inexcusably sloppy. The community, whipped into
a frenzy by a group of newspaper reporters desperate to scoop one another at every
opportunity, determined that Annie Kempton was an angel and Peter Wheeler the
devil incarnate. So he was hanged. The advantages of being white, male, and, if
possible, educated and affluent are readily apparent in the text.
The Ballad of Jacob Peck is weaker than Peter Wheeler. It is the retelling of an
extraordinary case that shook a community to its core and brought to town the
machinery of high law. Jacob Peck was a self-proclaimed divine, quite likely
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illiterate, who blew into Shediac on the heels of other Baptist and New Light
itinerants. He held revivals of a sort and acquired some kind of hold over the mind
of a farmer named Amos Babcock, who, inspired by words emanating from the
mouth of his eldest daughter while she lay prostrate under Peck’s influence,
murdered his sister, Mercy Hall, in full view of his horrified family. Komar delves
into the lives of the various players in the prosecutions that played out (189-92).
Unfortunately, Komar misunderstands the law and legal processes too often to
recount here. Her discussion of benefit of clergy, for example, misconceives what it
was and how it operated. More fundamental to her argument are three significant
problems. First, she appears to think that Babcock should not have been hanged
because he was under the sway of Jacob Peck. She rightly points out that Babcock
had no lawyer to help him and was not entitled to one. However, the surviving
evidence could certainly support the jury’s conclusion that Babcock was sane
enough to be convicted, either under the later 19th-century definition that Komar
refers to or under the actual tests for legal insanity applicable in 1805, which
prosecutor Ward Chipman apparently presented (166-7).9 We may certainly feel
sympathy for the deluded Babcock, but there was legal justification for convicting
him. Second, the crime with which Komar thinks Peck ought to have been charged,
“solicitation of murder,” does not appear in canonical legal treatises of the period; it
can hardly be held an “egregious blunder” not to have charged Peck with it.10 The
usual offence was of being an “accessory before the fact,” but, given the facts
(particularly the intermediary role played by Babcock’s daughter), it likely would
have been hard to make that case against Peck.11 Third, Komar clearly thinks that
prosecuting Peck for sedition and blasphemy instead was an unfathomable mistake.
The charges may strike us as peculiar, but they were used frequently in the Anglo-
American world during the period. Indeed, in his 1803 Treatise of the Pleas of the
Crown, Sir Edward Hyde East included among those indictable for blasphemy “all
impostors in religion; such as falsely pretend to extraordinary missions from God,
or terrify or abuse the people with false denunciations of judgments”12; this was
Peck in a nutshell. Komar has done a lot of valuable research on this incident and its
principal actors; but the book is seriously flawed, most importantly because of her
misunderstanding of law and legal institutions.
9 See Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown [etc.],
ed. Thomas Dogherty (London, 1800), I:*30-1; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England: In Four Books, 15th ed., ed. Edward Christian (London, 1809), IV:*25. The asterisk
is used in certain old, canonical legal texts to help the reader follow how the later writer or editor
has glossed the original. The page number with the asterisk is the page upon which the glossed
text appeared in the original edition.
10 Komar, Jacob Peck, 129. There is no such entry in Sir Edward Hyde East’s Treatise of the Pleas
of the Crown, vol. 1 (London, 1803) or in Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 4.
11 An accessory was one who commanded, hired, or counselled someone to commit murder, and “the
counselling another is necessarily included in the exciting, moving and procuring him”; East,
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, I:352-53. See also Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae, I:*615.
Being an accessory before the fact was potentially capital. The charges of blasphemy and sedition
did the job of charging Peck with a lesser offence, as neither was capital (contrary to Komar’s
assumptions on p. 137).
12 East, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, I:3.
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Material culture: technology, expertise and consumerism
Two themes emerge in the books that focus on Canada after about 1870: the rise of
highly gendered consumerism and the interrelationship among professional
expertise, technology, the law, and the state’s capacity for surveillance and control.
These themes interweave in many interesting ways. Martel notes the redefinition of
behaviours formerly considered vices in the early 20th century as health issues.
Physicians made claims to particular knowledge and made reputational gains
accordingly. Undoubtedly, too, their growing expertise led to greater investment in
research, more success in treating ailments, material prosperity, the acquisition and
promotion of new technologies, and further reputational gains. They organized and
acquired the legal trappings of a self-regulating profession.
Boudreau says that the figure of the female shoplifter arose during this period. She
was understood as childlike and unable to resist the lure of possessing attractive objects.
Shoplifters, it was thought, could be “respectable” middle-class women seeking the
trappings of status, or poor or working-class women stretching their budgets. Female
detectives were hired by Eaton’s and other stores to watch out for shoplifters (131-2).
One of the villains in Komar’s Lynching of Peter Wheeler is a detective – a self-
promoting bully whose claims to expertise evidently impressed the journalists, who
loved the idea that Nova Scotia had its own, real-life Sherlock Holmes even if the
flesh and blood man was far less careful about the evidence than his fictional
counterpart. Boudreau’s book illuminates the larger context, as Halifax’s police
acquired patrol cars, two-way radios, and fingerprinting technology. Boudreau notes
a shift from class control to crime control, although of course certain classes attracted
more policing than others. New technologies and the ideology of professional
expertise that justified them, however, were not adopted instantly. Firearms were not
provided to police officers, even after one died after being shot in 1924. The chief of
police did not think all the members of the force should be armed: surveillance of the
supposed criminal element was acceptable, but providing this small group of
uniformed citizens with the means to injure and kill others was not. According to
Brown, Canadian police forces started arming in the late 19th century with the
Northwest Mounted Police and provincial police forces leading the way (142).
Computers made it possible for the RCMP to make use of the first gun registry.
Firearms were already controversial, as Brown makes clear. They became
fashionable after the US Civil War, in part because their manufacturers, finding
themselves with stock on hand, sought another market. Canada beckoned,
conveniently located and already alarmed by the arming of its southern neighbour.
Firearms became more accurate, more lethal, and easier to use. Governments
supported firearm acquisition. Newly urbanized men were urged to express their
manliness by becoming crack shots and joining shooting associations. Wildlife –
“game” – was rendered accessible more for “sportsmen” than for those who needed
to eat them, and restrictions on the weapons that could be used to kill them were
passed to prevent animal populations from being completely wiped out. Publicists
declared that the empire’s successes in the Anglo-Boer War had come from British
aptitude for guns and invented the myth that the Upper Canadian militia had fended
off the Americans in the War of 1812 (it was actually British regulars). Ladies, in
1900-10, were encouraged to take up shooting as a decorous pursuit, less strenuous
than golf or tennis. Some kinds of guns were marketed as appropriate toys for boys.
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As horrific accidents predictably multiplied, pressure was applied to the state to
limit children’s access to firearms. The 1892 Criminal Code prohibited the sale or
gift of air guns to those under 16 but did not prohibit the possession of either air guns
or pistols. Provinces acted in the early 1910s, and Ottawa finally made it an offence
to sell or give a firearm to someone under 16 in 1913, although guns could still be
made available to them as part of family or group activities (111-13).
Some calls for gun control seem to have rested on a rather anti-consumerist
foundation, with voices in the 1870s calling for controls on revolvers on the basis
that young men had begun to consider them a necessary part of their outfits and liked
swaggering around being dangerous (66). One lesson of the First World War was
that crack shots could still be mowed down with machine guns and gas. Concerns
about the American love of guns punctuated public discourse about guns in Canada
from the late 19th century on. The pistol – so small, so readily concealed, so closely
associated with lawless, violent Americans – was suspect from its first appearance
on the market, but the long gun has always had friends among those who hunted. In
the late 1960s and 1970s registering long guns proved far more politically
challenging than registering pistols, especially as these efforts became
interconnected with the sense of western alienation that became so strong during the
Pierre Trudeau period. Aboriginal and Métis groups strenuously objected to being
regulated and disarmed, as they had since first being subjected to this kind of
legislation in the later 19th century. White male westerners, however, were the
loudest opponents of initiatives that would have required, among other things,
registering the ownership of all firearms and providing guarantors for gun licenses.
Regulating firearms, then, amounts to regulating an object that is simultaneously
associated with healthful (for shooters) outside activities, and highly destructive,
with the brunt of the destruction often borne by innocents. The state’s capacity and
willingness to respond to calls for firearm regulation have depended in part on the
availability of surveillance technologies and in part on how it has weighed the risks
and costs of different kinds of restrictions. These calculations have been heavily
structured by beliefs about gender, race, ethnicity, and Aboriginality.
Conclusion
The books discussed here make significant contributions to Canadian legal history
and raise important research questions. The shifting nature of the state and the
meaning and function of legal actors and institutions are problematized.
Understandings of technological possibilities and professional expertise have
affected the public sense of what the legal system can and should do. Gender, class,
race, ethnicity, and Aboriginality have structured conversations about harm,
responsibility, and appropriate responses. Our constitutional understandings have
changed in ways that call for more research. Since Craven’s, Boudreau’s and
Komar’s books focus on New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, it may be appropriate to
add here that it is heartening to see excellent research on those provinces bringing
such important questions into the spotlight. As a westerner (albeit one who has
written on Nova Scotia and Ontario), I look forward to more research that illuminates
variations in how these various threads have been woven across the country.
LYNDSAY CAMPBELL
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